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Spatial Metaphors of the Ancient World: Theory
and Practice
Group C-2 of the Excellence Cluster 264 Topoi Space and Metaphor in Language, Cognition,
and Texts is dedicated to the study of spatial metaphors and their functions in texts of
different genres, languages, and epochs. This outline of the work of group C-2 takes as
its point of departure and theoretical framework a general linguistic typology of spatial
metaphors. This outline is followed by a series of case studies ranging from wisdom texts
and philosophical treatises to tragedy and from Ancient Egyptian to Shakespearean En-
glish. These examples are aimed at illustrating both the challenges and the possibilities of
the study and interpretation of spatial metaphors in their respective contexts.
Metaphor analysis; metaphor typology; spatial metaphors; orientational metaphors; con-
ceptual metaphor theory; metaphorical spaces; spatial thinking.
1 Introduction
The project of Group C-2 of the Excellence Cluster 264 Topoi Space and Metaphor in
Language, Cognition, and Texts is dedicated to the study of spatial metaphors used by diverse
cultures from antiquity through the early modern era to the present day. Its research
begins with the observation that spatial metaphors emerge due to a universal principle by
which non-spatial (and also other spatial) subject matter can be cognitively grasped, pro-
cessed, and verbally represented in spatial terms. Although this principle is indisputably
universal, it is nevertheless implemented in language-speciﬁc ways which, depending on
the available linguistic resources, allow for the formation of a culturally conditioned con-
ceptualization of space. However, the concept of space is not necessarily associated with
cognition or language (whether spoken or written), whereas metaphors are implicitly
linked to both: they originate in thought1 and then ﬁnd their expression in language and
texts. Hence, this article will take as its point of departure a proposition for a linguistic
typology of metaphors in order to establish a theoretical framework for the classiﬁcation
of spatial metaphors. The case studies that follow are taken from different languages and
genres andwill showcase the range and diversity of applications of spatial imagery in texts.
2 Towards a typology of spatial metaphors
The following typology of spatial metaphors is purely technical, according to the speciﬁcity
of the spatial concept employed metaphorically (difference between types 1 and 2) and
the extent of the metaphor (difference between types 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3). This schema does
not take into consideration all the various possible functions of spatial metaphors. Like
all metaphors, they may have an explicatory, didactic, persuasive, or evaluative purpose
and perhaps even encompass novelty of expression for a particular purpose. They may
1 Cf. e.g. Gibbs 1996.
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also, in some cases, serve no function in their respective context, particularly if they are
conventional (entrenched), and in these cases their use might not even be deliberate.2
1. Our ﬁrst type of spatial metaphor is called orientational.3 The term derives from
cognitive metaphor theory, which deﬁnes metaphor very generally as speaking of some-
thing in terms of something else.4 This is effected in terms of a mapping between two
previously unrelated conceptual domains: the tenor from a speciﬁc target domain is con-
ceptualized in terms of a vehicle from a different source domain.5 The mapping transfers
the structure of the source domain and imposes it on the target domain; the resulting
conceptualization is referred to as a conceptual metaphor and expressed as target is
source.6 The deﬁning feature of orientational metaphors is the use of abstract spatial
conﬁgurations (instead of speciﬁc locations or places), such as in(side) – out(side), up
– down, left – right, or center – periphery, to give spatial orientation or structure
to a non-spatial concept. Often, two opposite spatial conceptualizations are correlated,
such as in up is more and down is less, or right is good with the correlate left is bad.
However, this type of metaphor is often no longer recognized as a metaphor due to the
conventionality of the underlying conceptualizations. Thus, orientational metaphors are
very often non-deliberate and conventional, but sometimes available as a basis for new
metaphoric expressions as well.
2. In contrast to this ﬁrst type of orientational metaphor, which relies on abstract
spatial relations and conﬁgurations, the next class of spatial metaphors utilizes more spe-
ciﬁc locations or places. Thus, metaphors belonging to this class can be spotted more
easily, since they possess a higher degree of metaphoricity. In the following classiﬁcation,
they will be arranged according to the cognitive extent of the metaphor, which may vary
according to the text in which a particular metaphor occurs or to the author employing
it.
2.1. The ﬁrst, and most basic, type of this class of spatial metaphor is the use of a
concrete or speciﬁc space or location on the lexical level when spatial characteristics are
applied to a single word or phrase.7 This occurs when a non-spatial term is referred to,
or used, as if it were a place or space, or when one spatial term might be metaphorically
2 For the use of the categories ‘conventional’ and ‘deliberate’ cf. e.g. Steen 2008 and Steen 2011, 38–
43. Contrary to earlier theories of metaphor, cognitive metaphor theory holds that deliberate usage
is not a requirement for the identiﬁcation of metaphor. For a theoretical approach to distinguishing
varying degrees of ‘metaphoricity’, i.e. the degree to which an individual textual metaphor is regarded
as metaphorical by a recipient (as opposed to applying the obsolete ‘dead’ – ‘alive’ distinction, which
was already criticized by Richards 1936, 101–102) see Hanks 2006 or Müller 2008, esp. 178–209; Müller
deﬁnes metaphoricity as a continuum starting with expressions whose original metaphorical character
is entirely obscured by semantic opacity and poetic novel metaphors with high metaphoricity forming
the other end of the spectrum.
3 On the theory of orientational metaphors cf. esp. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 14–21, or Kövecses 2010, 40.
4 Cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 36 et passim: “Metaphor is principally a way of conceiving of one thing
in terms of another.” This general deﬁnition seems to echo the deﬁnition in Aristot. poet. 1457b6–7:
μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ (…) “metaphor is the transfer of a foreign name”. For
a cognitive perspective on Aristotle’s position also see Mahon 1999.
5 The terms ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ were ﬁrst introduced by Richards 1936, 96–97 to denote the two com-
ponents of a metaphor, but they have come to be used as general convenient terms for the signiﬁer and
the signiﬁed of a metaphorical transfer. ‘Source domain’, ‘mapping’, and ‘target domain’ belong to the
terminology of conceptual metaphor theory.
6 We here follow the convention in cognitive linguistics to print conceptual metaphors (as opposed to
individual linguistic metaphors) in small capitals to indicate that they do not appear as such in texts, but
are deduced from individual textual occurrences of metaphorical language.
7 For an attempt to deﬁne and analyze metaphor on the lexical level through the difference between basic
and contextual meaning see Crisp et al. 2007, esp. 3, also summarized in Semino 2008, 11–12, further
developed in Steen et al. 2010, esp. 1–42.
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conceived of in terms of another, different space or place.8 These metaphors result from a
simple transfer of vehicle to tenor without multiple mappings and are therefore isolated,
i.e. non-conceptual.9
2.2. A second, and more extensive, type of spatial metaphor is the use of a speciﬁc
space or location on the conceptual level. While the conceptual metaphor must still be
instantiated on the lexical level of individual linguistic metaphors, it is not a single word,
but a whole concept which is given spatial properties by means of metaphoric transfer.
This happens when a spatial metaphor on the lexical level can be regarded as a mapping
of a more extensive underlying conceptualization. In the case of this second type of spatial
metaphor, it is insufficient to view tenor and vehicle as isolated lexical entities, but they
have to be regarded as parts of their respective domains.10 Thus, this type of metaphor
entails multiple transfers, i.e. mappings, which form conceptual metaphors with a spatial
source domain being correlated with a target domain.11 For such mappings to qualify for
the category of spatial conceptual metaphor, the source domainmust be spatial, while the
target domain may, but need not, be a spatial concept.
2.3. The most extensive type of spatial metaphor can be found in cases where a spe-
ciﬁc space or location is used metaphorically on a broader textual level. It is possible
for a longer narration or even a whole text to function as a spatial metaphor (some-
thing like amacro-metaphor). Assuming the traditional deﬁnition of allegory as ‘extended
metaphor’12, this type could also be described as spatial allegory.
3 Case studies from ancient, medieval, and early modern
languages and texts
Literary scholars attempting to apply a theoretical model of metaphor by using a theoreti-
cally-based method to analyze their texts cannot fail to encounter the difficulties posed by
the range and diversity of metaphors in context.13 Metaphors differ widely in both form
and meaning, and the analysis of an individual linguistic metaphor often necessitates
considerable interpretative effort that cannot simply be transferred to another metaphor.
Thus, the following case studies are aimed not only at illustrating the possibilities of ap-
plying the typology of spatial metaphors outlined above to actual linguistic metaphors in
discourse. They also indicate the extent to which the study of texts requires the theoretical
framework in question to be modiﬁed in order to do justice to the creation and function
of spatial metaphors in their respective contexts. Furthermore, in the process they demon-
strate how drawing on additional theoretical approaches can inform and enrich the study
of metaphors in texts.
8 In the third conceivable case of a spatial term being denoted by a non-spatial term we would not call the
result of the transfer a spatial metaphor.
9 In cognitive metaphor theory, the terms ‘image metaphor’ or ‘one-shot metaphor’ are occasionally
employed to denote this type of isolated mapping, cf. Lakoff and Turner 1989, 89–96 and the deﬁnition
in Kövecses 2010, 327: “One-shot image metaphors involve the superimposition of one rich image onto
another rich image. (…) These cases are called ‘one-shot’ metaphors because, in them, we bring into
correspondence two rich images for a temporary purpose on a particular occasion.”
10 For the theoretical basis of interpretingmetaphors as cross-domainmappings see the fundamental works
of the cognitive linguistic theory of conceptual metaphors, esp. Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and
Turner 1989; Lakoff 1993. A recent assessment of the theory can be found in Steen 2011.
11 The use of several metaphorical expressions from one target domain referring to the same source domain
has been described as ‘extension’ by Semino 2008, 25–26. However, for this type of conceptual metaphor
to be present in a text it is not necessary that extension occurs; if a lexical metaphor is isolated, but evokes
the metaphorical equation of two domains, it is already possible to speak of a conceptual metaphor.
12 On the possibility of the ‘extension’ of metaphor cf. again Semino 2008, 25–26.
13 On the context sensitivity of metaphors see e.g. Stern 2000.
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3.1 The multiple levels of spatial metaphor in the ancient Egyptian
‘Teaching’ of Menena
The Teaching of Menena,14 in which the exasperated Menena remonstrates his son Pai-iri
for his worldly ways, provides some of Egyptology’s best-known examples of rhetorical
language. Much of this is due to the simultaneously conventional and highly innovative
use of spatial metaphors. As we shall see in other contributions (see the sections on the
Pauline epistles and the works of John Chrysostom below), there seems to be a tendency
across cultures to conceive of life choices in terms of space and particularly in terms of
path, which explains why corrective or generally persuasive genres tend to employ these
metaphorical strategies.
In any case, it is clear from the outset that the letter-writer/speaker Menena employs
such strategies at a very high level, demonstrating a degree of creativity not always ex-
pected of such pedestrian metaphors. Not only are deliberate15 spatial metaphors appar-
ent throughout the text, they frame the whole text. They also appear at both the lexical
level and at a conceptual level that develops linguistically throughout the whole text in
the manner of ‘metaphor scenarios’.16 The metaphors thus conform in great measure to
types 2.1. and 2.2. of the proposed typology.
At the lexical level, overt spatial source domains like ‘path’ are clustered with associ-
ated source domains of the ground, like ‘undergrowth’, ‘sandals’, or ‘thorn’, of the air, like
‘the route of the swallow’ and of water, like ‘storm’, ‘sea’, ‘sailing’, or ‘capsizing’.
These lexical features contribute signiﬁcantly to the construction of a metaphor sce-
nario based on the conceptual metaphor life is a journey. The path metaphor is in-
troduced using a sailing metaphor (which is a citation of a much earlier text, marked
in italics): “The storm was foretold for you before it arrived, my sailor, who is unskilled in
landing.”17 By way of highlighting the metaphoricity of this statement and extending the
scenario, an explicitly earth-bound path metaphor follows: “I am informed about every
path upon which [sc. the evil being] ‘Fierce-of-Face’ lurks in the undergrowth.”18
Both earth- and water-bound motifs are developed in the course of the text without
straying from the ‘path’ source domain. We will note two particularly innovative cases
thereof, which recur across the text as rhetorical ﬂourishes. In the ﬁrst instance, Menena
describes the misplaced conﬁdence of his wayward son in the following way: “You have
gone off without sandals because you have not yet been brought back by a thorn.”19
Later, the hopelessness of the situation is demonstrated by the recurrence of ‘thorn’ in
the context of a sea journey: “Look, I [i.e. Menena] have brought a thorn a cubit long
onto the submerged path but there is no way of beating it in.”20 Here the deliberateness
of the metaphor is emphasized by its seeming incongruity – how does one lay a thorn on
a path that is actually water? – as well as by its clear reliance on the earlier metaphor of the
barefoot (read: unprepared) Pai-iri not having yet stepped on a thorn (read: encountered
difficulty).
In the second instance, the word ‘capsizing’ is echoed by another, seemingly morally-
charged word ‘turning around’. The latter is used in relation to Pai-iri himself being
‘turned around’ – in other words, perverted.21 However, later in the text, the exhortation
14 Ostracon Chicago OIC 12074 + Ostracon IFAO Inv. 2188. The text has been dated to the reigns of
Ramesses III – Ramesses VI, ca. 1150 BCE (http://aaew.bbaw.de/tla – visited on 04/05/2016).
15 Steen 2008, 224.
16 Musolff 2006.
17 Rto 1–2.
18 Rto 2–3.
19 Rto 3.
20 Vso 6–7.
21 Rto 6 and Vso 3.
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to “turn yourself (back) around in order to consider my speech”22 uses the same word.
From this, we see that the semantic boundaries of the word were being played with by the
author(s) to create a complex but only seemingly contradictory metaphor: the meaning
seems to be simply ‘turning 180 degrees’ – for better or for worse.
What we can see from this case study is that Ancient Egyptian instances of path
metaphors correspond surprisingly well to features of the classical corpus, thereby rein-
forcing the proposed typology and providing exceedingly promising avenues (pardon the
metaphor) for future collaborative research.
3.2 On the predicament of metaphor as transfer. The Greek
symposion and the mixing-vessel
The study of any type of metaphor requires an examination of Aristotle’s (384–322 BCE)
deﬁnition ofmetaphor.23 The nounmetaphora (literally ‘transfer’) which occurs ﬁrst in the
work of the orator Isocrates (436–338 BCE) as a designation of certain poetic techniques24
is conceptualized philosophically by Aristotle some decades later and is conceived as
the result of a universal – linguistic and cognitive – process of transfer. Thus, the word
‘metaphor’ itself is from the beginning deﬁned as ametaphor, that is to say a transfer in the
ﬁgurative sense: the concrete spatial process of ‘transporting’ is transmuted into a dynamic
mental ‘transporting’. Aristotle’s theory of metaphor is a theory of comparison, which is
epistemologically substantiated and thus exceeds by far the limits of rhetoric. According
to Aristotle, metaphor presupposes that two elements can be thought of as similar (even
identical in some respects) as well as different and that in language, for this reason, one
can be used instead of the other. This constitutes for him the reﬂexive, epistemologically
relevant value of metaphor, since metaphor stimulates reﬂecting upon possible common
characteristics of two material or mental elements despite their differences. This gives rise
to the “problem of the relationship between language, thought, reality”, which so far has
not been solved, even by modern metaphor theories such as those of cognitive linguis-
tics.25 Hence the currently popular theory designating metaphor as a relation between a
‘source domain’ and a ‘target domain’ with associated ‘mappings’ (i.e. projections from
the ﬁrst domain onto the second) remains conﬁned to Aristotle’s theory of comparison,26
in spite of the harsh critique ventured upon it.
As a matter of fact, Aristotle, unlike many of his successors since the Roman theo-
reticians of rhetoric, does not perceive metaphor as a mere substitution. Furthermore,
he does not assume, as is often claimed, that metaphor is a replacement of something
basically ‘proper’ (or ‘appropriate’) by something basically ‘improper’ (or ‘inappropriate’).
In fact, he emphasizes that metaphorical processes of transfer, which he divides into four
categories (from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, and
according to analogy), are not unidirectionally ﬁxed.27 Rather, such transfers can run in
two opposite directions, and it is only the respective starting point that determines the
orientation of the perspective from which the comparison issues.
22 Vso 9–10.
23 Aristot. poet. 21, 1457b; cf. rhet. III, 1405a–b, 1406b–1407a.
24 Isocr. 9.9: in plural (μεταφοραί).
25 See Eggs 2001, 1102.
26 Lakoff and Johnson 1980 etc.; cf. the critical assessment of Eggs 2001, 1156.
27 On this matter and on the metaphysical and theological implications of Aristotle’s notion of metaphor
as well as on the problem of its applicability to ancient Greek lyric poetry see Schlesier 1986–1987.
Concerning the fallacies connected with the reading of ancient Greek literature in terms of metaphor
see also Stanford 1936.
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This excludes an absolute valuation or hierarchization of the elements, which are
implicitly compared by means of a metaphor. Conversely, Aristotle’s theoretical focus
on relations of comparability between two terms entails his deﬁnition of these terms as
expressions of ﬁxed and necessarily different – concrete or abstract – qualities, which may
connote – concrete or abstract – similarities. Therefore Aristotle does not envisage the
possibility of an already established semantic or contextual simultaneity or mixture of
qualities.
The study of the ancient Greek symposion is well-suited for pursuing the problem of
such a simultaneity and mixture with regard to the concept of metaphor in general and
spatial metaphors in particular. The Greek symposion is an institution, a social rite, and a
medium of conviviality whose cultural signiﬁcance extends well over the archaic and clas-
sical periods and at which variousmodes of space are simultaneously pragmatically linked
and operating on a cognitive and metaphorical level as well. This is triggered through the
mixture of several qualities28 and experiences available in the space of the symposion. It is
at the same time a space of religious rituals (libations for the deities of the symposion,
cultic poetry), a space for the use of pottery, which often represents the symposion
itself and aims at its imaginary construction, a space for aesthetic performances (poetry,
music, dance), a space of equally performative and agonistic exchange and interchange
involving reciprocity as well as rivalry (poetic, philosophical, erotic, musical), a space of
social, sexual, political, and cultural mixture and mobility, a space for the combination
of several linguistic forms of communication (discourse, song, mockery, praise, riddle),
but also for the overcoming of the constraints of literary and musical genres, a space of
ethical education (paideia) and playful pleasure (paidia), a space in which psycho-physical
boundaries can be dissolved (by ecstasy, enthousiasmos, inebriation), a space of intertwined
sensual perceptions and emotions (shared and potentially conﬂicting ones), and also a
space for the transfer of knowledge and cultural patterns.
The question whether the Aristotelian (or a later) notion of metaphor can do justice
to themultiple dimensions of the symposion – which are mixed in such a speciﬁcmanner
– will be demonstrated29 by the example of the kratēr (literally ‘mixing-object’).30
This vessel is emblematic for the peculiarity of the ancient Greek drinking party.
Thus, it is not surprising that the word kratēr can metonymically denote the symposion.31
Compared to drinking venues of other cultures, the speciﬁty of the symposion consists in
the fact that the Greeks typically refrained from drinking pure wine and usually diluted
the wine with water in different proportions, arranged in advance.32 To this purpose, the
kratēr33 was used (the noun is derived from the verb κεράννυμι, ‘to mix according to a
certain proportion’).
Surprisingly, at its second occurrence in ancient literature in Book 1 of Homer’s Iliad,
κρατήρ does not actually denote a vessel in which liquids aremixed: αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοισι
θεοῖς ἐνδέξια πᾶσιν / οἰνοχόει γλυκὺ νέκταρ ἀπὸ κρητῆρος ἀφύσσων (“Moreover this
one, for the other gods, to the right, for all of them / he poured out as wine sweet nectar,
drawing it from a mixing-vessel.” Translation: R. Schlesier). In this passage, the god Hep-
haistos is described as cupbearer of the other Olympian gods who draws nectar, the drink
of the immortals, from the kratēr. However, the function of the kratēr does not correspond
to its literal meaning, since it is not used as a mixing-vessel, but as a space containing
28 On these qualities of the symposion cf. esp. Rossi 1983; Lissarrague 1987; Murray 1990; Murray and
Tecuşan 1995; Schäfer 1997; Murray 2009; Hobden 2013; Schlesier 2016.
29 A more detailed inquiry is to be found in Schlesier 2016.
30 Cf. ﬁg. 1. On the political (aristocratic and democratic) aspects of the kratēr see Luke 1994.
31 See e.g. Theogn. 493, 643, 981. On the emblematic function of the kratēr in visual art see Lissarrague
1990.
32 Cf. Catoni 2010.
33 About this vessel, its different shapes, and its usage see e.g. Boardman 2001, 250–253.
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Fig. 1 | Red-ﬁgured krater from
Southern Italy: Dionysiac
procession by night (the satyr
on the left carries a black-ﬁgured
krater). 400–375 BCE.
an unmixed drink, nectar. Does this make the κρατήρ a metaphor in this context? The
Homeric passage highlights that the mixing-vessel, which is speciﬁc to human banquets,
has its place at the divine banquet as well. In terms of a modern theory of metaphor, one
could perhaps say that a spatial ‘target domain’ (the banquet of the gods) is denoted by
means of the term κρατήρ stemming from the spatial ‘source domain’ (the banquet of
humans), or else, in Aristotle’s terminology, that this usage constitutes a transfer from
the species (mixing-vessel) to the genus (liquid container). But does this entail that the
word κρατήρ is a comparison (εἰκών)34, in the sense of Aristotle’s general deﬁnition of
metaphor? Because of its precise functional determination, however, it is impossible to
equate the kratēr with other vessels not designated for the mixing of liquids. Rather, by
means of the inclusion of the kratēr into this context, divine and human dimensions of
experience are speciﬁcally mingled: at the divine banquet a particular vessel is used which
belongs by deﬁnition to the mixture of wine and water at human banquets, but the gods
adapt it for their own purposes and alter its function by employing it as container for
the pure drink reserved for them, nectar. Thus, a transfer is at stake here, however not a
metaphorical, but a functional one. What the kratēr represents in this context is a different
mixture from the one of water and wine: it points to the mixture of the human and the
divine spheres. It signals that the human dimension is also simultaneously present at the
divine banquet and that both kinds of symposion can be compared just like the two kinds
34 Aristot. rhet. III, 1406b–1407a.
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of drinks enjoyed at each.35 Yet the reﬂective potential of the present semantic context can
apparently only be grasped when the framework of the Aristotelian theory of metaphor
has been abandoned or at least expanded.
3.3 Spatial metaphors in the Pauline epistles: form and function
The Pauline epistles (written in the 50s of the 1st century CE) are well known for their
rich imagery, which makes them an excellent source for investigations into metaphors
(spatial or otherwise; also see the following study). Even though the epistles have a clearly
didactic and exhortative purpose, the form of their (innovative)metaphors can be analyzed
in terms of the fourfold classiﬁcation of poeticmetaphors, as expounded byGeorge Lakoff
and Mark Turner.36 Turning to the function of these metaphors, we contend that they can
be analyzed in terms of alienation37, but only if this strategy can be used for purposes
outside the goal of casting new light on familiar phenomena.
We will ﬁrst turn to the form of metaphors, starting with the elaboration of metaphors,
where elements of the source domain can be mapped in unusual ways onto elements of
the target domain. For instance, elaboration shows up for container metaphors in that
containers vary widely in the source domain, including less prototypical ones, like clothes,
or abstract states, e.g. “put on the Lord Jesus Christ”,38 or “those living in malice and
envy”.39
Second, metaphors can be explicitly questioned, i.e., the aptness of a metaphor is
challenged directly or in terms of showing the limits of the structural mapping from
source domain to target domain. For instance, Paul’s famous metaphor about Christian
life as a race calls it into question by pointing out that the metaphor fails to emphasize
that in the target domain there will be success and reward not only for one single person:
“Don’t you know that in a race all the runners run, but only one gets the prize? So run
that you may get it.”40
The next technique is the combination of metaphors. For instance, human bodies can
be introduced simultaneously in terms of the vessel and the house metaphor (body is
vessel/house): “We are the temple of the living God.”41
Finally, metaphors can be extended in that additional structure is transferred from
source domain to the target domain, which does not ﬁt in easily with the target domain.
Consider, for example, spatial metaphors presenting faith as a kind of path, thus giving
it a sense of direction that seems alien to the concept of faith: “They have swerved from
the faith.”42 This presents faith either as a dynamic development through several stages of
completion, or as a kind of guidance on how to lead one’s life.
In sum, Lakoff and Turner’s classiﬁcation of poetic metaphor43 has proven to be
applicable to the spatial metaphors in the Pauline epistles. This classiﬁcation accounts
35 This is further stressed in the Homeric passage by the mention that Hephaistos pours “from left to right”
(ἐνδέξια), just like the cupbearers at a human symposion usually do, and that he does not merely pour
the nectar for the gods, but “pours it out as wine” (οἰνοχόει), whereby nectar is explicitly set up as an
analogon to wine. However, it requires a further step, which is only taken by later authors, to use wine as
a metaphor for nectar and nectar as a metaphor for wine. In Homer, this is not the case.
36 Lakoff and Turner 1989.
37 Cf. Schklowski 1971.
38 Rom 13:14: ἐνδύσασθε τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν.
39 Tit 3:3: ἐν κακίᾳ καὶ φθόνῳ διάγοντες.
40 1Cor. 9:24:Οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι οἱ ἐν σταδίῳ τρέχοντες πάντες μὲν τρέχουσιν, εἷς δὲ λαμβάνει τὸ βραβεῖον;
οὕτως τρέχετε ἵνα καταλάβητε.
41 2Cor. 6:16: ἡμεῖς γὰρ ναὸς θεοῦ ἐσμεν ζῶντος.
42 1Tim 6:21: περὶ τὴν πίστιν ἠστόχησαν.
43 Cf. Lakoff and Turner 1989.
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for the form of the metaphors, but does not explicitly address the question of what the
function of these metaphors could be, especially in non-poetic discourse.
We contend that poetic metaphors in Paul’s epistles all instantiate a very general
function, i.e. they emphasize the differences between source domain and target domain.
These differences emerge through the fact that the structural mapping between source
domain and target domain is typically not perfect. This emphasis brings about alienation
as described by Viktor Schklowski.44 Alienation deliberately aggravates the process of
perceiving a phenomenon because it presents the phenomenon in a way that enforces
its conscious perception, not just its recognition.
However, if this analysis is on the right track, it raises the question of what purpose
is being served by alienation in non-poetic discourse. Poetic as they might be (at least in
part), the didactic and persuasive purpose of the Pauline epistles suggests that alienation
of metaphors cannot simply be an end in itself. Moreover, if alienation is deﬁned as a
process of deliberate de-familiarization, how could it be applied to the epistles, whose
topics are entirely novel to their readers (in fact, to anyone)?
Our tentative answer to these questions is that Paul as the founder of Christian the-
ology was constantly breaking new ground. His employment of metaphorical language
to do this makes perfect sense, since metaphors are a very natural tool for the description
of concepts hitherto unknown. At the same time, he was highly aware of the imprecision
inherent inmetaphor due to the only partial structuralmatch between source domain and
target domain. Consequently, he alienates metaphors in order to heighten the precision
of his writings, by warning his readers against taking his metaphors too far. This answer,
however, extends the concept of alienation by arguing that it can be used for purposes
other than de-familiarization.
3.4 ‘In Christ Jesus’ – Paul’s central metaphor
This case study also deals with spatial metaphors in the Pauline epistles, but rather than
analyze different techniques (like the previous example), will focus on one particular
instance of a spatial metaphor, Paul’s central metaphor of being ‘in Christ Jesus’. This
metaphor seems to have its origin in the ritual of baptism.
The word ‘Christians’ does not appear until the end of the ﬁrst century. Addressing,
greeting, and blessing the recipients of his letters, Paul sometimes called them the holy
‘in Christ Jesus’, referring to the local (Christian) assembly.45 Before deciding that the
phrase ‘in Christ Jesus’ refers to a speciﬁc space, it might help to note instances where
Paul explicitly marked ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ spatially.46 This is the case when to be ‘in Christ
Jesus’ is preceded by the action that a person is dipped into Christ as if one is dipped
into water,47 or puts Christ on as one puts on clothes. In such cases the phrase ἐν Χριστῷ
[Ἰησοῦ] implies a speciﬁc locality inside, ‘inChrist [Jesus]’, in which the person or persons
are: “As many of you as were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. …
All of you are one ‘in’ Christ Jesus.”48 Paul understood baptism in such a way that when
the new believers, who are baptized into Christ Jesus, are dipped into the body of the
44 Cf. Schklowski 1971.
45 E.g. 1Cor 1:2; 16:24, Phil. 1:1; 4,21; cf. 1Thess. 2:14; Gal 1,22: ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.
46 Cf. Rom 3:24; 6:11, 23; 8:1-2, 39; 15:17; 16:3; 1Cor 1:2, 4, 30; 4:17; 15:31; 16:24: Gal. 2:4; 3:14, 26, 28;
Phil. 1:1, 26; 2:5; 3:3, 14; 4:7, 19, 21; 1Thess. 2:14; 1Thess. 5:18; Phlm. 1:23.
47 To be “baptized into” (βαπτίζομαι cum εἰς) means ‘to be dipped into another substance’. Cf. Plut. Parall.
Gr. et R. h. 305C; Strab. geogr. XII 5,4 [798]; Ach. Tat. Leucippe and Cleitophon II 14.9; Flavius Josephus
Jewish War 2.476.
48 Gal 3:27+28b: ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε. … πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἷς ἐστε
ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.
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cruciﬁed Christ, they are buried with Christ.49 Baptism was the way in which newcomers
gained access to the community of believers. According to Paul, they were all dipped into
Christ’s body50 and are thus ‘in Christ Jesus’, as he puts it.51 Somebody who is ‘in Christ’
died with Christ und lives a new life in Christ. They are a new creation,52 God put them
in Christ.53 Those who are not inside, stay outside.
The phrase ‘in Christ Jesus’ is based on the belief of being integrated into the body
of the cruciﬁed and sharing his resurrected body through baptism. Paul extended the
reference of the phrase ‘in Christ Jesus’. He uses the phrase ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ to designate
a metaphorical space which the insiders share. The phrase does not assign believers to a
speciﬁc local congregation.54 Those ‘in Christ Jesus’55 could be everywhere, for they are
kept together by being ‘in Christ’: “So we, who are many, are one body ‘in’ Christ.”56 Paul
maps various other aspects of his message unto the basic metaphorical space ‘in Christ
Jesus’. Here the promises to Abraham, that people from all nations will belong to the
children of God, are fulﬁlled.57 According to Paul ‘in Christ Jesus’ is a metaphorical space,
where humans are given redemption from sin, freedom from the Law and God’s peace.58
Here God justiﬁes the ungodly, reconciles his enemies with him.59 In Christ Jesus he will
not condemn them,60 but will give eternal life.61 Even those who ‘fall asleep’ (= die) ‘in
Christ [Jesus]’ will be raised.62 For those who are outside, there is no hope.
3.5 The spatial metaphors of John Chrysostom
John Chrysostom (c. 349–407 CE) is, as his later epithet suggests, one of the eminent and
most proliﬁc preachers of ancient Christianity. In particular, he has earned a reputation
for his exuberant and powerful oratory, a style that bristles with drastic phrases, extrava-
gant images and hyperbole.63 Part of his literary legacy is the pervasive use of metaphors,
as documented both by individual metaphorical expressions and elaborate metaphorical
scenarios or allegories. His employment of metaphorical language in homilies and trea-
tises alike is extremely suitable for an exploration of the ways in which spatial metaphors
work in context. Before casting a glance at some examples from his writings we should
mention in passing that Chrysostom, as the scion of a Greek upper-class family, received a
thorough rhetorical training and that his rhetorical skills are visible across his vast œuvre,
not least in his metaphors.64 Alongside numerous Biblical images, we ﬁnd a cornucopia
49 Rom 6:3–4.
50 1Cor 12:13.
51 Rom 6:11, 23.
52 2Cor 5:17.
53 1Cor 1:30.
54 E.g. Rom 16:3, 9; 1Cor 4:17 and Phlm. 1:23.
55 E.g. Rom 16:7, 10; 1Cor 4:15; 2Cor 12:2.
56 Rom 12:5: οὕτως οἱ πολλοὶ ἓν σῶμά ἐσμεν ἐν Χριστῷ.
57 Gal 3:14, 26–29.
58 Rom 3:26; Gal 2:4; Phil 4:7.
59 Gal 2:17; 2Cor 5:18; cf. 1Cor 4:10.
60 Rom 8,1.
61 Rom 6:11, 23.
62 1Cor 15:18-19; 1Thess 4:16.
63 OnChrysostom’s rhetoric in its cultural setting seeWilken 1983, 95–127, and in particular on his imagery
Kertsch 1995.
64 For an overview of Chrysostom’s use of metaphors and their relation to classical rhetoric see Ameringer
1921, 56–67. See further Wilken 1983, 107–110 and 117–120.
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of traditional similes and metaphors, such as those of athletes, economy and seafaring.65
Chrysostom’s stunning command of rhetoric meant that he knew how to apply the most
effective devices to sway his urban audience.
What is striking about Chrysostom’s use of spatial metaphors is that they often occur
not individually but grouped to whole clusters of metaphorical expressions, not all of
which are necessarily three-dimensional. To drive his point home, the preacher time and
again unfolds a wide range of metaphors, images and similes, all highlighting speciﬁc
qualities of the matter under consideration. A ﬁne case in point is an extract from the
homily Cum Saturninus et Aurelianus acti essent in exsilium, where a veritable catalog of
images and metaphors throws the opposition between wealth and poverty into sharp
relief.66 First, he presents material wealth as a runaway who never maintains his loyalty
to one person but constantly switches from one to the other. However, not content with
merely employing a single metaphor, Chrysostom elaborates on this point, adding that
wealth is likewise a traitor who hurls his victims into an abyss,67 a murderer, a beast, a
steep cliff, a rock amid unceasing waves, a whole sea battered by constant storms, further
a relentless tyrant, a master worse than any barbarian and an enemy who will never give
up his hatred. Should the congregation still not have grasped the message, Chrysostom
proceeds to characterize poverty in similar fashion, but as the direct opposite. Poverty
now ﬁgures as an asylum, a safe haven, constant safety, well-being without any danger,
life free from waves, mother of wisdom and root of humility. It is interesting to note
how carefully Chrysostom crafts this contrasting pair of metaphorical catalogs so that his
ﬂock cannot but be overwhelmed by the sheer mass of images.68 As elsewhere, he clusters
a whole range of graphic expressions, some of them metaphorical, increasing its effect
through antitheses, parallelisms, isocola and verbal resonances.
At ﬁrst glance, this ﬁrework of metaphors results in overkill, as the audience is not
allowed sufficient time to dwell on one individual metaphor and reﬂect on its full import.
What we encounter in this and similar passages is a list of linguistic metaphors rather
than a detailed concept that is mapped onto an abstract domain. It is evident that such a
kaleidoscope is highly indebted to the training in the rhetorical schools of late antiquity,
where students, through the repetition of preliminary exercises, learned to build up a
good stock of ready-made expressions to be used in oratorical improvisation. Moreover,
the metaphors seem to be unconnected or even unsuitable, as Chrysostom combines
human characters in action with static features of nature. There is, however, a rationale
behind the cluster. The impressive range of metaphors is integrated by the view that
wealth, despite the love of its followers, is an unstable and difficult possession, which
will ultimately ruin its possessor, whereas poverty is a state of peace of mind, which
creates an atmosphere conducive to Christian virtue. The variety of metaphors on the
linguistic level does not convey a single and coherent concept but rather evokes a general
impression that is illuminated from different angles (cf. metaphor type 2.1. above). It
adds a material dimension to an abstract entity, wealth and poverty respectively, in order
to make it more accessible and, as it were, tangible, and spotlight speciﬁc qualities that
have gone unnoticed so far.
While Chrysostom’s kaleidoscope of spatial metaphors might appear ornamental,
borrowing from the rhetorical excesses of sophistic orators, other passages suggest that
65 It goes without saying that already the New Testament writings drew on the shared repository of classical
images and analogies. See, for instance, 1Cor 9:24–27 with the analogy of runners and boxers in an
athletic contest.
66 Chrysostom, Cum Saturninus et Aurelianus etc. 2–3 (PG 52.416).
67 The metaphor of the abyss of vice is further used with regard to the metaphorical theater. Cf. Retzleff
2003.
68 The high density of metaphorically used words in a passage of text has been described as ‘clustering’ by
Semino 2008, 24–25.
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his spatial metaphors have a far-reaching effect on the audience in the context of ethical
instruction. To consider them superﬁcial embellishment on the rhetorical level would be
a misleading assumption, because in many cases Chrysostom does develop the metaphors
further and display a subtle technique. In a treatise that summons the addressee to
abandon the pleasures of the worldly life and return to themonastic vocation Chrysostom
makes numerous references to physical space and depicts vivid scenes taken from urban
life.69 One didactic example of a young man from an affluent family uses spatial language
to great effect as Chrysostom combines the literal and the metaphorical meaning of up
and down (cf. orientationalmetaphors, type 1, above).When the lad, aptly called Phoenix,
is speaking from above, on horseback, to saintly men who seek to win him back for the
spiritual life, the relationship of up and down nicely visualizes the misguided pride and
the perverted values of the protagonist.70 In fact, as the narrator comments, Phoenix has
fallen from the religious life above into earthly concerns and is nowdeep in vice. However,
ultimately, after his Phoenix-like fall and rise again, he enters the path upwards to heaven.
Not only this brief narrative, but the entire treatise employs the orientational metaphor
of up and down to highlight the need for renouncing the vainglory of the world and
returning to the spiritual realm.
This evaluative hierarchy also features prominently in the ﬁnal exhortation. After a
brief quotation of the Biblicalmetaphor of the yoke of God,71 Chrysostomﬁrst introduces
the spatial metaphor of agriculture. He asks his addressee to close up the streams of
destruction, lest he suffer severe damage and the cultivated ﬁeld be completely ﬂooded.
Only thenwill hemake up for the loss and even add proﬁt. After that, Chrysostom quickly
switches to another scene and imagines the addressee as wrestling with a dangerous
opponent. In an elaborate image he draws on the familiar metaphor of athletics72 and
envisages the addressee as a wrestler who has been beaten by his competitor but can
recover his ﬁrm stance and ward off the other’s blows, until, with the help of God, he
succeeds and even saves other people with his virtue. At ﬁrst, the two scenarios, the farmer
and the wrestler, do not easily match, as they represent two widely different situations.
However, both are united by the notion that a strenuous effort amid adverse conditions
will result in success and proﬁt, as long as the person concerned ﬁxes their eyes on a clear
goal. This lesson, which is also referred to at the beginning of the passage by talking about
the noble yoke and the goal (telos), is represented, not by single linguistic metaphors, but
by whole scenarios that evoke graphic images in the mind of the audience (cf. conceptual
metaphors, type 2.2., above). Chrysostom furnishes the two spatial metaphors with just
sufficient detail – characters, objects, actions and events – so that the audience can imagine
how it feels to protect the crops from ﬂood or ﬁght an antagonist.
What is striking in passages like this is the role of the audiencewithin themetaphorical
scenarios. Instead of merely providing descriptions of spaces, Chrysostom integrates his
addressee in the scenes imagined. Since the experience of the spatial dimension is deeply
embedded in the human body, the Church Father wants his audience to become part of
the metaphorical spaces, engage there, even though only in imagination, and develop a
feeling for these environments. The intended result of this involvement of the audience
in the textual space is that they adopt the perspective of the characters and re-enact their
experiences. Consequently, they will develop an understanding of what needs to be done
69 The treatise is entitled Ad Theodorum lapsum, edited by Dumortier 1966. On the questions of dating and
addressee see the introduction in Dumortier 1966.
70 Chrysostom, Ad Theodorum lapsum 1.18–9.
71 Cf. Mt 11:30.
72 For Chrysostom’s use of images and analogies from athletics see Koch 2007, who is, however, rather
interested in Chrysostom’s familiarity with sports. Sawhill 1928 has also a collection of passages where
Chrysostom refers to the Christian agōn.
Spatial Metaphors of the Ancient World: Theory and Practice 465
or avoided if they want to achieve their aims. The close link that Chrysostom establishes
between the bodily experience of imaginary spaces and human reasoning suggests that
in his view the process of understanding can be enhanced by drawing on the body and
the embodied memory.73 Chrysostom uses conceptual metaphors, which are based on
familiar domains such as agriculture and athletics, and maps them onto the spiritual life,
so that the audience views it in a different light. Since the spiritual life is a rather abstract
concept, the spatial scenarios with their vividness fulﬁll a didactic purpose, enhancing the
believer’s awareness of the duties and tasks required from a clergyman.
3.6 Augustine’s epistemology and spatial metaphors
When it comes to describing cognitive processes conveying a form of cognition which is
regarded as the highest, pure, divine etc. knowledge, ancient philosophical and religious
texts often resort to spatial metaphors and spatial conceptualizations. By means of these,
they locate this process of cognizance ‘above’ the world which is perceptible through the
senses or within an ‘inner part’ of the human being or of that person’s soul respectively
(rarely in the head). Especially Platonists and in their wake also Platonizing Christians
often speak of an ‘ascent’ into the ‘realm’ of the intelligible, of ‘stepping outside’ (ecstasy)
of the body, of ‘stepping inside’ into the ‘innermost’ from which again a ‘transcending’
of the ‘uppermost’ part of the soul is supposed to be possible.
How a textual analysis guided by theoretical approaches to metaphor can be fruit-
fully employed for the comprehension of epistemological and theological concepts will
be demonstrated by the example of Augustine’s (354–430 CE) work On the Trinity (De
trinitate), which has increasingly become the subject of research into the ‘philosophy of
mind’.74
According to the philosopher Mark Johnson, space and container metaphors are
formed even at a pre-linguistic stage on the basis of bodily experience and become
‘image schemata’, or patterns of perception.75 The body is experienced as a bounded space
structured by the distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ (which serve as orientational
metaphors, type 1 above). According to the Platonic idea of man, which is at the basis
of Augustine’s epistemology, the area which is, by means of the container metaphor,
deﬁned (and, in fact, excluded) as ‘outside’ contains the objects of perception. Material
and corporeal bodies move in this space, and also the bodies of the perceivers. In contrast
and as a complement, the area ‘inside’ encompasses everything which is immaterial and
not perceptible to the senses. Immaterial and imperceptible are the mind or the soul,
metaphorically speaking the ‘location’ in which processes of thought and cognition take
place, where not only awareness, objects of knowledge, memory and recollection are
‘located’, but also truth per se, which is often, by means of another spatial, orientational
metaphor, called the ‘highest’.
The primary focus of the second part of Augustine’s work De trinitate is the question
of the relationship between man, who is according to Gen 1:27 ‘in God’s own likeness’
(imago dei), and theMaker, who has created the human ‘likeness’. According to Augustine’s
explanations, the imago dei is present ‘in’ the human mind; it is not a metaphor, but a
kind of structure which does not represent God in a mimetic sense. For in his earthly,
mortal body, man cannot see God ‘face-to-face’, but only, in agreement with the Pauline
metaphor, as a ‘reﬂection in the mirror’ and ‘in an enigma’.76 These refer to God through
73 Cf. e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1999.
74 Brachtendorf 2000; Horn 2001. Cf. Fuchs 2010; Lagouanère 2012.
75 Johnson 1987, chapters 2 and 4.
76 1Cor 13:12.
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their ‘likeness’ and man can ‘work’ on them by trying to free them from ‘obfuscations’.77
The human mind ‘carries’ God’s (real) image in itself and is thus not wholly ‘detached’78
from him, but man can only see him indirectly, or metaphorically: by means of a ‘dull
mirror’.79 In addition, both the ‘place’ in which the imago dei is located and the object of
the imago itself, i.e. God as destination of the itinerariummentis, are ineffable and inexpress-
ible.80 In his teachings about the memoria in book 10 of his Confessions, Augustine speaks
of an ‘inner non-location’81 or he denies the spatiality of the ‘place’82. Spatial metaphors
which are based on concrete bodily experience are still employed for the description of
what is inexpressible in language, but they are negated. Thus the means of explanation of
Augustine’s ‘negative theology’ are transformed into ‘negative metaphorical imagery’.
By locating the origin of mental images and conceptualizations – also of the concept
of trinity – in the ‘exterior world’ perceptible to the senses, Augustine anticipates in some
respects what has been called by Mark Johnson the body in the mind.83 Thought is guided
and structured by the recollection of bodily experience, and similarly the ‘thought space’
of the humanmind is imagined and rendered imaginable through the concepts informed
by sensory perception. Contrary to the theories of an embodied cognition (after the
zoologist Jakob von Uexküll), no topology of the brain is developed in which cognitive
processes and functions are assigned to speciﬁc areas of the brain (as an organ); rather, the
container metaphor and the associated bodily experience – to use Augustine’s terms: the
concept of the ‘innerman’ – structure the abstract domain ‘mind/soul/thought/cognition’
and offer orientation for language and thought about this area of discourse.84
Augustine’s use of spatial imagery and the container metaphor in De trinitate can
best be described with recourse to the theory of conceptual blending (or conceptual
integration) developed byGilles Fauconnier andMark Turner:85 as Augustine employs the
notion of image both in ametaphorical (species et aenigma) and amore concise sense (imago
dei), he creates an ‘interaction’86 between the scope of application and the metaphor
(target domain and source domain), making them intermingle and integrate reciprocally.
The target domain (thought) and the source domain (space) are not strictly separated,
but act as equal suppliers towards a new conceptualization of cognitive processes: the
human mind is metaphorically conceived of as ‘space of cognition’ which contains a
non-metaphorical but not entirely perceptible reality (the image of God). From this
conceptual blend emerges a mental space which can only be described with negative
metaphors. It contains – metaphorically speaking – an ‘interface’ or a ‘point of contact’
where something which is entirely removed from all things imaginable is described by
means of the concreteness of metaphor. The explicatory value of the spatial imagery
obviously consists in the potential of space to render imaginable the opening into the
inﬁnite and the removal of three-dimensionality in inﬁnity. Thus spatial metaphors serve
as a kind of ‘tilting ﬁgure’ between spatial and concrete thought and the imagination of
what is not perceptible to the senses.
77 Augustine, De trinitate 14.6–20.
78 So Horn 2001, 112–115 against Brachtendorf 2000.
79 Contrary to Horn 2001.
80 Augustine, De trinitate 15.13; 15.50.
81 Augustine, Confessiones 10.16: interior locus, non locus.
82 Augustine, Confessiones 10.37: nusquam locus.
83 Johnson 1987.
84 According to Lakoff and Johnson 1980.
85 Fauconnier and Turner 2002.
86 The use of the term ‘interaction’ follows the work of Black 1962.
Spatial Metaphors of the Ancient World: Theory and Practice 467
3.7 Love, hunting, and spatial metaphor in medieval literature
Since antiquity love and desire have been linked to hunting,87 which can be understood
as a spatial concept. The hunting actions – the source domain – presupposemovements in
space, especially in the attempt to reduce the distance between hunter and prey. Thus the
hunting metaphors, the comparisons and the hunting plots emphasize the spatial aspects
of desire.
Wolfram von Eschenbach (c. 1170 – c. 1220) composed his Parzival between 1200 and
1210 as an adaptation of Chrétien de Troyes’ Perceval written between 1182 and 1191. In
one episode the knight Gawan rides out in order to prove in a trial by combat that he is
not responsible for the death of the king of Ascalun. On arrival, Gawan encounters the
son of the late monarch, Vergulaht, who, failing to recognize the guest, sends him on
to the castle. There, Gawan is received and entertained by Antikonie, Vergulaht’s sister.
On the spur of the moment, Gawan and the princess engage in a love affair. Left alone
with her, Gawan thinks to himself, “that a weak eagle often catches a big ostrich”, and
he gropes under her cloak.88 This metaphor is not mentioned by Chrétien. The eagle
does not belong to the noble birds and was usually not tamed by hunters.89 Gawan’s
identiﬁcation with the eagle may be due to his wild behavior as he gropes under the
girl’s cloak. Besides, the ostrich, Gawan’s oversized prey, was known as an easy prey as it
cannot ﬂy.90 Gawan, therefore, can hardly be said to brace himself for a difficult task. The
girl raises no objections, but unfortunately, the pair is discovered by a vassal, who accuses
Gawan of rape.91 Subsequently, the lovers are assaulted by amob of furious citizens, until a
landgrave interrupts the ﬁghting on the grounds that the guest is entitled to the protection
of his host until the trial.
Meanwhile Vergulaht returns from an unsuccessful attempt to hunt an egret in the
course of which he loses his horse and his clothes, which he has to leave to his falconers
according to custom. While the young king fails in hunting with falcons, the guest
identiﬁes himself with an eagle and hunts the king’s sister.92 We know from medieval
hunting treatises that falcons are afraid of eagles. This is why hunters were advised not
to hunt with falcons when there were eagles close by.93 Thus, according to the narrative
logic, the king’s falcons must fail, while the eagle Gawan catches his prey. In addition,
while ﬁghting against the angry citizens, Gawan manages to muster courage by admiring
the maiden’s beauty, which is described as follows: “I doubt you ever saw a better-looking
hare on a spit than she was there and here between the hip and her bosom.”94 Wolfram
compares the princess to an animal often caught and devoured by eagles,95 prepared here,
however, for digestion by the human stomach. The hunting theme occurs on different
87 Cf. Ovid, Ars amatoria.
88 Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival v. 406,30-407,2: “[…] daz dicke den grôzen strûz / væhet ein vil kranker
ar. / er greif ir undern mantel dar […].”
89 The king of Ascalun has his ﬂaws as well, as he does not master falconry which belonged by that time
to the aristocratic ideal. See Schnell 1974, 249, and Kaiser Friedrich II. Über die Kunst mit Vögeln zu jagen,
book 2, 176–181.
90 See Schnell 1974, 254-255.
91 In the French text, the young lady is accused of collaboration with the enemy. This difference may appear
substantial to the modern reader, but for the medieval audience (who knew Ovid’s Ars amatoria or other
works inﬂuenced by the ‘praeceptor amoris’), rape may have implied silent consent on the part of the
girl.
92 See Schnell 1974, 258-260.
93 See Kaiser Friedrich II. Über die Kunst mit Vögeln zu jagen, book 4, 110; book 5, 173; book 6, 242–244, 248,
257, 259–260.
94 Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival v. 409,26–29: “baz geschict an spizze hasen, / ich wæne den gesâht ir
nie, / dan si was dort unde hie, / zwischen der hüffe unde ir brust.” The translations of the Middle High
German text by B. Trînca are based on the translation by Edwards.
95 See Kaiser Friedrich II. Über die Kunst mit Vögeln zu jagen, book 1, 36.
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levels within the episode: in a metaphor, in a comparison, and as a plot element. This
results in humorous, burlesque correspondences between the characters, and serves as an
ironic commentary on the events of the plot. While the king fails, the stranger manages
to reduce distance to his prey.
Wolfram does not only modify certain details and add others to Chrétien’s story, he
also omits narrative elements. He does not recount, for example, Gauvain’s hunt for the
white roe96 which escapes him before he reaches Escavalon (the French equivalent to
Ascalun). Instead of becoming a successful hunter, Gauvain, it would seem, ﬁnds himself
hunted. For his newfound “amie” refers to amember of the angrymobwhich attacks them
as a “mad dog”97. Gauvain’s erotic desire is interrupted by people who desire violence.
The fact that dogs were often used in deer hunting would suggest that Gauvain is being
identiﬁed here with the former game. He changes from hunter to prey. This all happens
while the girl’s brother is out hunting with real dogs in the woods (not with falcons, as
in the German version).98
Chrétien’s reference to Gauvain’s pursuit of a doe probably refers to a text from the
‘lai’ tradition, the short anonymous narrative called Lay de Graalent. In this text, a fairy
lures the knight she lusts after by sending a white roe,99 which he follows until he meets
the beautiful woman. In other ‘lais’, the love story with a fairy follows an unsuccessful
hunt.100 The wild animal apparently provokes or leads to erotic desire. In Chrétien’s
text, the recompense for the lost roe is not a fairy but an attractive princess living in
the country Escavalon, whose name resembles that of the fairy realm of Avalon. Yet the
French poet disappoints his audience’s expectations, as the love story is a very short one,
althoughGauvain promises to be the girl’s knight for the rest of his life.101 Contrary to the
destiny of the protagonists of the ‘lais’, Gauvain leaves his beloved a short time after their
encounter.Wolfram gives up these allusions to the ‘lai’ tradition. At ﬁrst glance, onemight
be tempted to attribute this to the absence of ‘lais’ in German literature, and conclude that
Wolfram’s audience would not have understood the references. One would, however, be
mistaken, for Wolfram only inserts them into another episode where Chrétien does not
mention them.
After his reconciliation with the people of Ascalun, Gawan comes upon a wounded
knight and rides in the direction from which he came. He follows a trail of blood; it is “as
though a stag had been shot.”102 Chrétien does not use this comparison. Gawan reaches
Logroys where he meets a beautiful woman, Orgeluse, beside a well, and he falls in love.
Fairies often sojourn near wells,103 so Orgeluse takes their place in Wolfram’s romance
(but not in Chrétien’s text, where the lady stands on a grassy plain104). The hunting motif
anticipates the encounter even though Gawan is not hunting on this occasion. As was
already mentioned, Wolfram adopts the deer-hunting theme from his source, but not
only does he insert it into another episode, he also contradicts his French precursor’s
changes to the ‘lai’ tradition: Gawan marries the woman he meets this time, so that, after
the hunting motif, a long-lasting relationship follows – just as in the ‘lais’, but contrary
to Chrétien’s romance. However, Wolfram also contradicts the ‘lai’ tradition, as Orgeluse
is at ﬁrst unwilling to give her heart to Gawan, whereas the fairies are longing for love.
96 Chrétien de Troyes, Perceval v. 5680: “bische”.
97 Chrétien de Troyes, Perceval v. 5956: “chien esragié”.
98 See also Trînca 2008, 171-172.
99 Lay de Graalent v. 201: “bisse”.
100 See Baumgartner 2003, 26 and the ‘lais’: Guigemar (v. 79–122), Equitan (v. 46–60) by Marie de France, the
anonymous Lay de Guingamor (v. 157–678), Lay de Tyolet (v. 346–351), Lay de Melïon (v. 71–86).
101 Chrétien de Troyes, Perceval v. 5828–5829: “dist qu’il iert / Ses chevaliers toute sa vie.”
102 Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival v. 507,26: “als ein hirze wære erschozzen dâ.”
103 See Lay de Graalent v. 206–222, Lai de Desiré v. 141.
104 Cf. Chrétien de Troyes, Perceval v. 6676.
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Wolfram’s knight has to experience many adventures before Orgeluse agrees to marry
him.
Gawan’s trip to Ascalun and Logroys is littered with hunting motifs. As elements of
the plot, metaphors, and comparisons they set up a macro-metaphor (cf. metaphor types
2.2 and 2.3), which describes love and illustrates the spatiality of desire.
3.8 Shakespeare’s use of metaphor in Coriolanus: theoretical aspects
Shakespeare’s (1564–1616) tragedy Coriolanus105 differs from many of his other plays in
its distinctive metaphoricity. Not only do individual characters make use of a variety of
speciﬁc metaphors as the occasion arises, but one overarching trope unfolds a structuring
force for the drama as a whole: the trope of the human household. This macro-trope is, at
times, articulated in an explicit manner by various speakers, but for the greater part of the
drama it remains unspoken, tacitly but devastatingly effective in terms both of the plot
and the interaction of its protagonists.
In theoretical terms, the use of the household metaphor in Coriolanus is therefore
interesting in more than one way: Typologically, it is obviously a spatial metaphor,
referring to the house or oikos and its management; also, to the limits of the house, the
demarcation lines that separate outer from inner space and the manner in which these
boundaries between interiority and exteriority are permeable ormay be transgressed. Due
to this semantic richness of its source domain, it is also an extremely versatile conceptual
metaphor (cf. metaphor type 2.2. above). It is capable of conceptualizing the human soul,
mapping the soul in its relationship to the body, the human unity of body and soul in its
relation, indeed correspondence with, the world, the relationship between individuals
within a larger aggregate such as a polis like Rome (or, for that matter, London).106
Finally, in connection with these traditional conceptual functions and the concomitant
need to unfold them on a somewhat larger scale, it tends to occur as parable or, more
often than not, as allegory, i.e. as metaphora continua or extended metaphor, in the sense
communicated to an early modern English audience by ancient rhetoric, especially by the
Roman rhetorician Quintilian (c. 35 – c. 100 CE).107
In all these respects, the household metaphor, in Shakespeare’s time, had become a
topos, or commonplace. That is to say, it was highly conventional. As appears from the
play itself, however, it was still amenable to, if not in need of, explication, or allegoresis.
In fact, as the process of allegoresis staged within the play comes to reﬂect the nexus of
allegory and allegoresis, its dramatic presentation assumes the structure of meta-allegory.
The play itself turns into a critical comment on the very process of producing and
reading an extended metaphor. Thus it grows into a comment on the facility with which
metaphorical discourse may be instrumentalized and put to political use. Hence, and in
the ﬁnal analysis, Coriolanus may also be seen to perform the failure of metaphor. This
needs to be explained.
To some extent, the literary effects of man’s household as a guiding metaphor in
Coriolanus are linked with the various forms it assumes, their differing degrees of con-
ventionality, complexity and ‘size’. Thus, for instance, the very conventionality of the
household metaphor hides the fact – which is in turn rendered perceptible in the course
of the drama – that ‘household’ and ‘economy’ are actually metaphors of each other. If,
then, the economy of a city such as Rome or London is conceived as a household, power
105 All citations refer to the edition by Parker 1994 (act.scene.line). For a detailed reading of the play see
Lobsien 2016.
106 Cf. Hes. op.; Aristot. pol. I, 1254b; Plat. Phaid. 79–84e.
107 Cf. Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, VIII 6, 44–53. Also cf. metaphor type 2.3. above.
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relations, distribution of goods and values are placed in a certain light, familiarized in
domestic, indeed homely terms, rendered comprehensible, and justiﬁed in a way that
seems natural, therefore indisputable. This is whatMenenius’ notorious Fable of the Belly
aims at in Shakespeare’s play. For it to function in the manner in which the speaker
intends it, its tropicality must remain implicit, covered by its topicality.
In addition, the text employs different aesthetic strategies in presenting its central
metaphor. These range from open display – Menenius telling his Fable of the Belly in
order to calm the unrest seething amongst the hungry plebeians – to extended dramati-
zation in a performance that never explicitly uses words like ‘household’ or ‘economy’,
because it does not need to use them. At the same time, Shakespeare’s play undermines
the very notion of allegory as a didactic trope, hollowing out its parabolic applicability
with respect to Elizabethan topical wisdom. This is also its major achievement: Coriolanus
demonstrates the hero’s ultimate failure in regulating his inner household, in realizing
Stoic oikeiōsis and indifference toward outer as well as inner affliction by pain and passion,
thus his tragic, paradoxical failure by way of doing precisely what he excels in and what
is deemed praiseworthy. Lastly, and with equally irritating effect, Coriolanus employs
strategies of reliteralization. This happens for instance when the hero’s family (his own
household) come to seek him out; it happened before with his spectacular move to exile
himself from the body politic by literally leaving it to ‘a world elsewhere’108; it happens
at the very end, when he falls prey to the inexorable ‘economic’ logic of retaliation, which
demands that treason be ‘paid’ by the traitor’s death.
All this is neither edifying nor does it conform to the contemporary ideological
orthodoxy of stoically founded Elizabethan romanitas.With respect to the functions served
by Shakespeare’s use of allegory in Coriolanus, these could be described as resulting from
a bi-directional critique, both in a structural and in a content-oriented, propositional
sense. Structurally speaking, in Shakespeare’s extended household metaphors, ‘source’
and ‘target domains’ seem to change places, so that their differences become blurred. The
‘system[s] of implications’109 they evoke interact in a manner that renders their points of
attachment oddly arbitrary.We are faced with allegories that are doubly pointed – towards
the reference of their apparent target and towards that of their source.
Thus, in Menenius’ Fable of the Belly,110 the critical potential of the allegory is bent
towards its target and thereby directed against its area of reference: While it was intended
to justify the unequal distribution of wealth and the inequity of power in the polis, by
the way it is presented and due to the circumstances in which it is placed in the play it
soon comes to function as a critique of those very phenomena. Above all, it fails because
it is so well known. It can therefore only be perceived ironically, both by its immediate
audience on stage and by its recipients in front of the stage, as a transparent attempt at
persuasion in the interests of the speaker’s own political party. Hence the plebeian hearers
repeatedly puncture the all-too-familiar ‘tale’111 by their sarcastic comments; hence the
speaker, too, responds in kind, inviting them to look at it in a jocular light, employing
humoristic body language or synecdochically addressing one of the hecklers as ‘the great
toe of this assembly’,112 thus trying to deﬂate aggression. However, the overall effect is
that the very conventionality of the parable is put on display and ridiculed. Worse, via
the dysfunctionality of the trope, the polis itself becomes the target of criticism. The
organological magic simply does not work. As a body, the City is divided against itself. It
turns against itself through the very medium of its central unifying metaphor.
108 Shakespeare, Coriolanus 3.3.136.
109 Cf. Black 1962, 41 (alternatively: “system of associated commonplaces”, 40).
110 Shakespeare, Coriolanus 1.1.86–152.
111 Shakespeare, Coriolanus 1.1.87.
112 Shakespeare, Coriolanus 1.1.152.
Spatial Metaphors of the Ancient World: Theory and Practice 471
Conversely, and with respect to the acting out of the extended household trope in the
fate of the hero, the functional direction is inverted. In its very performance, criticism
comes to be leveled against the source of this syndrome of ﬁgurative language. Now the
household model itself, the reference of the signifying level of the allegory, is challenged,
as Coriolanus, the perfect Stoic soldier, fails precisely because of his exceptional qualities.
His ostentatious self-appropriation, his almost desperate striving for self-sufficiency, with
martial virtue its own and sole reward, his remarkable imperviousness to pain and fear
all represent and evoke Stoic concepts – oikeiōsis conceived as the ideal economy of body
and soul in apathia and self-control. While these were propagated in Elizabethan schools
and society in order to inculcate the ideology of romanitas, they are here demonstrated to
be tragically dysfunctional. With them, the household allegory becomes questionable.
The critical charge rests within the underlying extended spatial trope. In the end,
the allegory becomes dubious qua allegory. It loses its signifying power both in the
market place and elsewhere. As Coriolanus fails to govern his internal household; as
the economy of political forces within the City, too, is shown to be fatally out of kilter,
the Stoical concepts are equally shown to fail – as instruments of masculinist education
towards heroic individualism, as enforcements of political discipline and subservience,
as legitimations of inequity, and ultimately also as explicatory and persuasive metaphors
purporting to transport ancient ‘economic’ ideology.
Shakespeare’s play, in systematically divesting the trope of man’s household of its
functionality, self-evidence and applicability, makes a general point about metaphor. It
seems to be saying that some sources (‘household’) may become too trite and too manip-
ulable to be of use in explaining or altering complex realities (‘Rome’); also, that some
targets (‘individual subjectivity’) are, perhaps, not amenable to this type of metaphoriza-
tion. This kind of critique is the prerogative of literature, although the cognitive effects it is
capable of producing certainly reach beyond the literary: they demonstrate the conceptual
potential of the aesthetic.
4 Conclusions and perspectives
The proposed theoretical framework for classifying spatial metaphors shows that the
metaphorical use of spaces and spatiality can occur to a varying extent and on all levels of
literary discourse. The case studies further illustrate the scope and potential of the analysis
of spatial metaphors through a number of genres and languages, ranging from wisdom
texts and philosophical treatises to tragedy, and from Ancient Egyptian to Shakespearean
English (thus spanning almost 3000 years of human thought and language). In a general
sense, they substantiate the initial claim that spatial metaphors are a universal principle of
human cognition. Somewhat more speciﬁcally, they show that the practice of attributing
speciﬁc spatial relations to non-spatial or less clearly structured spatial concepts is in
tune with the general tendency of the human mind to employ metaphorical thinking
and phrasing when coping with abstract and ‘difficult’ concepts.113 Thus, writers of all
times could avail themselves of spatial metaphors when attempting to describe, and
make sense of, such complex domains as life and life choices (case studies 1, 3, 5), social
institutions and interactions (case study 2), religious belief and doctrine (case studies 3,
4, 5, 6), cognition (case study 6), love (case study 7), or political as well as psychological
structures (case study 8). The resulting metaphors are complex and frequently inﬂuential,
developing amomentum and occasionally a history of their own. In some cases, especially
when it seems difficult or even impossible to express a concept literally and recourse to
metaphorical language is unavoidable, source and target domain may ultimately become
113 Cf. esp. Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Johnson 1987; and Gibbs 1996.
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intertwined to such an extent that the distinction between literal and metaphorical
thought and expression becomes blurred.
Thus, the examples chosen by the researchers of Topoi Group C-2 also vividly demon-
strate the limits of attempting to generalize about form and usage of spatial metaphors
in the light of the impressive diversity of actual, everyday as well as technical or literary
metaphors.
In conclusion, it may also be worthwhile to reﬂect that, while theories of metaphor
carry their value in themselves as media of insight and instruments of orientation, they
will not serve as methods of analysis to be proved or exempliﬁed by individual texts.
Rather than applying pre-existing conceptions of metaphor and trying to ﬁt its materials
into theoretical straightjackets, philological practice will therefore, in its attempts to
understand and interpret metaphors where they occur, do best closely to consider their
respective functional and compositional contexts and permit the particular instance to
challenge the general notion.
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